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NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS: OVERVIEW OF TRIBAL, STATE,
AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Mary Beth West*
I. Introduction
Making natural resources development work on Indian reservations
requires understanding the complex jurisdictional framework applicable
to Indians and non-Indians within Indian Country. Structuring suc-
cessful arrangements is possible only with a complete knowledge of
the jurisdictional framework within which they will operate. In partic-
ular, questions concerning jurisdiction to tax, and authority to regulate
activities such as mineral extraction, production of timber and other
renewable resources, hunting and fishing, zoning, and the environment
will determine the viability of natural resources development for tribal
entities.
As the title of this article indicates, regulation of natural resources
development on Indian lands involves three players: Indian tribal
governments, the states, and the federal government. The division of
jurisdiction among these players has been forming since the early
nineteenth century.' The pace of legal development, however, has
increased considerably in modem times, since tribes have begun to
develop reservation lands and natural resources, to exercise regulatory
jurisdiction over the land's progeny, and to challenge exercise of
jurisdiction by others. The outlines of tribal, state, and federal juris-
diction continue to be delineated and refined as cases come before the
courts today.
This article discusses the historical development of jurisdictional
analysis in Indian law, and provides a brief overview of jurisdiction
in specific regulatory areas. It concentrates, in particular, on several
recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court has decided
questions concerning jurisdiction to tax and to zone.2 Unfortunately,
the Court's recent heavy reliance on demographic and other factors in
resolution of jurisdictional issues leaves tribal, state, and federal au-
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. J.D.,
1972, Stanford Law School; B.A., 1966, University of Michigan. This article was
prepared for the ABA Conference on Natural Resources Development on Indian Lands:
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1. The Marshall trilogy first delineated the jurisdictional outlines, which have
evolved to the current time. See infra notes 4-6.
2. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
72 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
thoities, as well as non-Indian commercial entities, with less than full
guidance concerning jurisdiction for purposes of structuring natural
resources deals on reservation lands.
II. Historical Development of Jurisdictional Analysis:
The Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty
A. Historical Origins of the Jurisdictional Framework
The origins of the trilateral division of authority in Indian Country
are found in the Constitution3 and in the jurisdictional outlines first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh,4 Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia,5 and Worcester v. Georgia.6 Drawing on the
Indian Commerce Clause7 and federal treaty-making authority,' doc-
trines of discovery and conquest, 9 and the doctrine of tribal sover-
eignty, Marshall constructed a set of relationships among tribes, the
federal government, and the states. In doing so, Marshall emphasized
the unique nature of these relationships: "The condition of the Indians
in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other
two people in existence .... [T]he relation of the Indians to the
United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which
exist no where else."' 0
Marshall's model basically involved largely autonomous tribal gov-
ernments subject to an overriding federal authority but essentially free
of state control." The three central components of the model are
described below.
1. Federal Jurisdiction
The federal government has broad constitutional power over Indian
tribes. This power, often described as "plenary,' 2 authorizes Congress
3. See infra notes 7-8.
4. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, grants exclusive authority to the executive to
enter into treaties.
9. McIntosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574 (holding that discovery gave the European
colonial powers fee simple ownership of the domain they discovered, subject to the
Indians' right of occupancy.).
10. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831).
11. CHARL s F. WILcKNsoN, AmERCAN INDIANS, Tam AND THE LAW 24 (1987).
12. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COEmN].
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to determine the balance of jurisdiction in Indian Country, 3 i.e., to
decide what powers tribes, states, and the federal government may
exercise. This broad federal power, however, is not unlimited. Con-
cluding that the relationship of tribes to the United States resembled
that of a "ward to his guardian, ' 14 Marshall held that the federal
government had assumed the role of protector of the Indian tribes. 5
Congress and the Executive Branch are subject to two types of
limitations in their dealings with Indian tribes. The first are constitu-
tional limitations. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution constrains Congress and the Executive Branch in decisions
concerning recognized Indian property rights.16 Actions by the Exec-
utive and Congress have also been held subject to judicial review based
on principles of constitutional and administrative law, under a standard
which requires that the legislation or action under attack be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians.'"17
The second set of limitations are those inherent in the federal
government's special trust relationship with Indian tribes. These limi-
tations translate into several concrete requirements. Although Congress
can abrogate Indian treaties, the courts have developed rules of inter-
pretation which require that to do so Congress must exhibit a "clear
and plain" expression of intent. As the Supreme Court held in Wash-
ington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, s "[a]bsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely
reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . ... '19
Likewise, the courts have applied unique doctrines of construction to
other congressional and executive action, including statutes and exec-
utive orders affecting Indian tribes. Basically, federal actions have been
construed liberally where the establishment of Indian rights is at issue,
and narrowly where the question concerns limitations on those rights.
13. The term "Indian Country" has been defined by Congress for purposes of
federal criminal law in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). That definition is generally also used
in civil contexts. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
The term will be used in this paper consistent with this definition.
14. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment, which prohibits the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, has been held to pertain to Indian
property rights "recognized" by Congress, such as by treaty or statute. United States
v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476
(1937).
17. COHEN, supra note 12, at 217-18.
18. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
19. Id. at 690.
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2. Tribal Jurisdiction
Indian tribes are sovereign governmental entities. Tribal govern-
mentad authority derives not from federal delegation, but from the
tribes' original sovereignty. 20 Chief Justice Marshall held that discovery
and incorporation into the United States had placed inherent limitations
on the external sovereign powers of the tribes, such as the power to
make treaties and establish political relationships with foreign nations. 2'
In Marshall's view, however, Indian tribes had originally been treated
as sovereigns and had not lost that basic sovereign authority by virtue
of their relationship with the federal government. Tribal authority thus
could be lost only through federal action or voluntary surrender."
In matters of internal self-government Marshall viewed tribal au-
thority as exclusive, absent limitation by treaty or statute.2 3 That
authority has come to include, inter alia, the power to determine the
form of tribal government, determine membership, legislate, administer
justice, and exclude persons from the reservation.
3. State Jurisdiction
States, of course, normally have plenary power over their territory,
subject to federal constitutional authority. Marshall's construction,
however, carved out an exception to this rule. In Worcester v. Geor-
gia,u Marshall held that state law generally did not apply to Indian
affairs within Indian territory, absent federal law so providing.2 This
view had two bases: first, that the Constitution delegated authority
over Indian affairs to the federal government rather than to the states;
and second, that the Cherokee treaties reserved governing authority
within Cherokee territory to the tribe free of state interference. 26 While
the Supreme Court has adhered to the constitutional principle, the
tribal insulation from the states contemplated by Marshall has been
eroded over time.
B. Refinements to Marshall's Original Construct
Marshall's model involved largely autonomous tribal governments
subject to "plenary" federal authority but essentially free of state
control. As Charles Wilkinson notes in his book, American Indians,
20. CoheN, supra note 12, at 232.
21. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
22. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 47-48.
23. Id. at 27, 54-55.
24. 14 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
25. Id. at 562-63. Worcester denied state jurisdiction over non-Indian missionaries
on the Cherokee reservation in violation of Georgia law.
26. Id. at 538-39.
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Time and the Law, 27 courts thereafter began to grapple with the real
meaning and import of Marshall's model.3 Some courts continued to
treat tribes as strong sovereigns free of federal constraints absent
express legislative limitations.2 9 Other courts viewed tribes as subject
to apparently unlimited federal power. For instance, in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, ° the Supreme Court held that Congress had the unilateral
power to abrogate Indian treaties and to transmute Indian property
rights into individual allotments." This line of cases treated tribes as
lost societies without the ability to exercise governmental powers, which
needed federal or state intervention to fill the void.
As courts grappled with these issues in the late nineteenth century,
other social and demographic pressures began to affect the calculus.
Before mid-century, almost all Indian land had been held communally.
However, the push for assimilation of Indians into mainstream Amer-
ican life, in concert with the theory that assimilation would occur most
effectively if Indians became farmers, led Congress to pass the General
Allotment Act in 1887.32 That Act authorized the President to allow
to individual Indians up to eighty acres of agricultural or 160 acres
of grazing land, to be used for those purposes.3 3 At the same time,
pressures for non-Indian settlement on Indian lands led Congress and
the Executive Branch to try to find ways to open those lands to non-
Indians. That effort led to enactment of numerous statutes and agree-
ments opening reservations to non-Indians or terminating portions of
reservations in favor of non-Indian settlement. 4 The legal effect of
these agreements and statutes has been the subject of considerable
litigation..3 1
27. WILKINSON, supra note 11.
28. Id. at 24.
29. As noted by Wilkinson, this line of cases is represented by Exparte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (murder involving only Indians not punishable in federal courts
because Congress had not expressly provided for federal jurisdiction; later superseded
by the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)), and Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896) (Indian tribes not limited by the Constitution's grand jury requirement or
by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments because tribal powers pre-existed the Consti-
tution).
30. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
31. Id. at 566; see also McBratney v. United States, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (upholding
state jurisdiction over a murder involving non-Indians on Indian land in the absence of
federal law explicitly providing for such jurisdiction).
32. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1035 (Lake Traverse Reser-
vation).
35. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation held not diminished by act providing for the sale and disposition of certain
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Allotment and opening of Indian lands created checkerboard patterns
of Indian and non-Indian settlement on Indian reservations. Increased
non-Indian settlement on or near reservations also meant that Indian
lands began to emerge from the remote backwaters of the United
States. As we now know, these effects represented only the beginning.
Today all Indian reservations are within state boundaries. Many abut,
or are even within, large cities or metropolitan areas, such as Phoenix,
Tucson, Seattle, Miami, and Reno. These factors have created juris-
dictional questions and pressures which, in many cases, are only now
being considered by the courts.
C. Erosion of Tribal Authority in the Modern Era
As states began increasingly to assert jurisdictional authority over
activities within Indian reservations, courts were faced with more
refined jurisdictional questions. In the modern era, severe demo-
graphic, social, and other pressures have led to erosion of tribal
authority.
1. The Williams Test
The 1959 Williams v. Lee 6 case is generally considered to mark the
beginning of the modem era of judicial treatment of jurisdictional
issues. Williams held that Arizona state courts lacked jurisdiction over
a civil action brought by a non-Indian merchant against a Navajo
Indian and his wife to collect for goods sold them on credit within
the reservation.3 7 In making its decision the Court articulated the test,
"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of the reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 38 Based on
several factors, 39 the Supreme Court found that to allow exercise of
lands); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (reservation boundaries were
diminished by three acts providing for cession of lands to Government); DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (Lake Traverse Reservation held terminated
by agreement "ceding" all claim, right, title, and interest in all unallotted lands); Mattz
v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (holding that Klamath River Reservation not terminated
by 1892 act which allotted some lands to Indians and opened others to non-Indians);
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (holding that land "opened" to non-
Indian ownership in 1906 remained Indian Country in spite of being owned by a non-
Indian and being within township limits).
36. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id.
39. Congress' consistent assumption that states lack authority to regulate the affairs
of Indians on reservations unless expressly granted that power, the congressional policy
promoting Indian self-government, the language of the Navajo treaty which implied that
the internal affairs of the tribe remained within he jurisdiction of the tribal government,
and the existence and strengthening of the Navajo tribal government and courts.
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state jurisdiction over this civil action against an Indian would "un-
dermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and
hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
selves."' 4
2. Erosion of the Williams Test
Although Williams departed from Marshall's notion of absolute
tribal insulation from state authority, its holding was based on theo-
retical underpinnings similar to those used by Marshall, i.e., that tribes
maintain inherent sovereign authority absent diminishment by Con-
gress. However, these theoretical underpinnings, as well as the Williams
test itself, have been limited in the modem era, primarily as they relate
to tribal exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indians. 4
a) Implied Divestiture of Authority
Inconsistent with Tribal Status
First, and perhaps most serious, has been the theory propounded
by some courts that tribes lack jurisdiction over non-Indians or non-
member Indians' in some circumstances because exercise of such juris-
diction would be "inconsistent with their status." 42 This thesis was
invented by Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,43
which held that the Suquamish Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over
a non-Indian living on its reservation." Although it was extended to
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in the Duro decision,
Congress has subsequently recognized the inherent criminal jurisdiction
of tribes over nonmember Indians on the reservation. 4
The effects of Oliphant and Duro are twofold. First, and most
obvious, Indian tribes lack jurisdiction criminally to prosecute non-
40. Id. at 223.
41. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
42. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 676 (criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians);
Montana, 450 U.S. at 544 (civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on non-Indian
owned fee lands); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191 (criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
43. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
44. Id. at 212.
45. Duro, 495 U.S. at 676. A number of courts have also used the term "non-
members" rather than "non-Indians" in civil cases. Because the cases did not involve
nonmembers, however, use of the more inclusive term had no legal effect. See, e.g.,
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Congress overrode the Duro decision originally for one
year. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077,
104 Stat. 1892 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301)). Congress later overrode Duro permanently.
Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646, 646.
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Indians on their reservations, and maintain such jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians only by virtue of congressional action. Second,
and less obvious, those cases broke from the traditional division of
powers over Indian affairs. In initiating the notion of implied dives-
titure of authority inconsistent with tribal status, the Court encroached
on the power to determine the outlines of tribal jurisdiction historically
rese:rved to Congress."
The Montana v. United States47 decision expanded the Oliphant
analysis into the area of tribal civil regulatory authority. Holding the
Crow Tribe implicitly divested of authority to regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing on reservation lands owned in fee by non-Indians, 48
the Supreme Court relied on the following formulation:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the
relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the
tribe....
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is neces-
sarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to de-
termine their external relations. But the powers of self-
government, including the power to prescribe and enforce
internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve
only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they
are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue
of a tribe's dependent status.49
Therefore, at least with regard to activities on non-Indian lands
within the reservation,5" the Court seemed to view the outlines of tribal
self-government as limited to relations among members of a tribe; it
also viewed relations with non-Indians as an aspect of "external"
46. See Robert Laurence, Governmental Power in and Around Indian Country 3-
6 (19,39) (unpublished paper prepared for presentation to the Institute for Mineral
Development on Indian Lands, co-sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation and the American Bar Association Committee on Native American Natural
Resources Law). Congress, however, reasserted its authority by recognizing inherent
tribal powers in the areas denied by Duro. 104 Stat. at 1892; 105 Stat. at 646.
47. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
43. The Court rendered this holding notwithstanding the fact that non-Indian owned
fee lands within the boundaries of Indian reservations fall within the definition of
"Indian Country" for purposes of jurisdiction. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying
text.
49. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (quoting United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (emphasis supplied)).
50. The Court had no trouble holding that the tribe could exercise regulatory
authority over non-Indians hunting and fishing on land belonging to the tribe or held
by the United States in trust for the tribe within the reservation. Id. at 566.
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sovereignty lost by virtue of the tribes' dependent status.-1 This view
is certainly a far cry from Marshall's model in which the "external
sovereignty" lost by tribes involved the power to establish relations
with foreign nations.52
In Montana, the Court did mitigate this drastic thesis by holding
that tribes may exercise civil regulatory authority over non-Indians,
even on non-Indian fee lands, under two circumstances. First, the
Court acknowledged that tribes may regulate, through taxation, li-
censing, or other means, the activities of non-Indians who enter into
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, such as con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements. Second, the Court found that
tribes retain the inherent power to exercise civil authority over conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within their reservations when that conduct
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."
It is not easy to align the holdings and analysis in Oliphant and
Montana. For instance, if tribes' "external" sovereignty over non-
Indians has impliedly been lost for activities on non-Indian lands, can
such sovereign authority be regained by private contract? Why would
a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction over criminal behavior on its reser-
vation not rise to the level of regulation having a "direct effect on
the ... health or welfare of the tribe?" Why would regulation of
non-Indian hunting and fishing not directly affect the political integrity,
economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe, in view of the
fact that neither fish nor wildlife stocks necessarily confine themselves
to non-Indian lands, and in fact may migrate throughout the reser-
vation? Nevertheless, these cases clearly seem to view certain aspects
of tribal jurisdictional and regulatory authority over non-Indians as
having been lost by implication, despite the fact that the activities to
be regulated occurred on the reservation.
b) The Move Away from Sovereignty to Preemption
As applied, the Williams test had two parts. The first, denoted by
the phrase "absent governing Acts of Congress," calls into play a
federal preemption analysis, although Williams did not use that term.
The second recognized that, absent preemption by statute or other
federal action, courts would look at tribal sovereignty to determine
whether state action infringed on that tribal prerogative. 4 On the
theory that federal law did not govern the situation, the Williams
court based its holding on the test's second prong.
51. Id. at 564.
52. CoHEN, supra note 12, at 244.
53. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
54. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 222 (1959).
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Later decisions, however, tended to rely more heavily on preemption.
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission55 struck down
a gross-receipts tax imposed by Arizona on a non-Indian business
located on the Navajo reservation based on federal laws regulating
trading with Indian tribes. Likewise, Kennerly v. District Court of the
Ninth Judicial District" relied on the preemptive effect of Public Law
280 in striking down a tribal attempt, by regulation, to give state
courts jurisdiction concurrent with the tribe.
By 1973 the Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission 7 clearly acknowledged a trend "away from the idea of
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal pre-emption. ' 58 The Court found that the modern
cases "tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty
and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define
the limits of state power."' 9 The Court used tribal sovereignty not to
solve the issues, but simply as a backdrop against which the applicable
federal statutes and treaties should be read.
In applying preemption analysis, courts generally have been willing
to look broadly for preemptive activity. Findings of preemption have
been based on federal policy and on broad schemes of federal regu-
lation, as well as on explicit statutory language. 60 Because preemption
in the Indian context may be implied, and because courts have generally
presumed a lack of state jurisdiction in Indian Country, preemption
in the Indian context differs from that in normal constitutional anal-
ysis. Its outlines are more flexible and favorable to tribes.
Nevertheless, courts in Indian cases have not always been true to
the concept of Indian preemption. 61 For that reason - and because
tribal sovereignty must by its very nature extend beyond matters subject
to federal preemption - the retrenchment brought about by Mc-
Clanahan's limitation of tribal sovereignty to a "backdrop" in juris-
dictional analysis has created problems in recent years.
c) Balancing of Interests
Finally, another erosion of the Williams test involved judicial at-
tempts to balance interests as part of jurisdictional decision making.
In the tax area, courts began looking at the balance of tribal, federal,
55. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
56. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
57. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
58. Id. at 172.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
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and state interests in taxation of activities in Indian Country. 62 Early
cases generally found state interest in collecting revenues insufficient
to overcome tribal and federal interests in taxing activity on reserva-
tions.63 As described below, however, later cases have proved trouble-
some.
D. Recent Judicial Interpretations of Jurisdiction
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has maintained and exacerbated
the erosion of Williams. The basic themes from past case law are still
evident: the Court continues to espouse the notion that tribes lack
jurisdiction inconsistent with their status,6 to rely primarily on federal
preemption in deciding jurisdictional questions, using tribal sovereignty
only as a backdrop, 5 and to continue to balance tribal, federal, and
state interests.6
The current Court, however, has added several strange, new twists
in its analysis - twists which are, indeed, bizarre if one reviews the
principles underlying Williams and the Marshall trilogy.
1. Implied Loss of "External Sovereignty"
First, as shown in the Brendale case, four justices now appear to
subscribe to the view, formulated in earlier cases, that "by no more
than the Court's ipse dixit, Indian tribes have lost substantial portions
of their inherent power over tribal territory." 67 Like the earlier decision
in Montana, Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy appear
to characterize tribal authority over non-Indians as part of the "ex-
ternal sovereignty" which tribes lost by conquest and discovery over
150 years ago. 6
62. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832,
838 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-
57 (1980); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 n.13 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151; McClanahan 411 U.S. at 174-75.
64. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 427 (1989); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
65. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). But see Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 903
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484 U.S. 997 (1988) (holding state taxes void as interfering
with tribal self-government).
66. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 163.
67. Susan Williams & Kevin Gover, State and Indian Tribal Taxation on Indian
Reservations - Is It Too Taxing? (1989) (symposium paper), in 1989 HAgvARD INDUAN
LAw SyMPosium 165 (Harvard Law School Publications Center 1990).
68. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 453 (1989). Although a majority of the Justices agreed on the outcome of the
Brendale case, the Justices were split on the underlying rationale and rendered three
separate opinions.
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]:n Brendale, these justices ruled that the Yakima Tribe's exercise of
zoning authority over non-Indians in an area of the reservation, which
was demographically largely non-Indian, was necessarily inconsistent
with the tribes' dependent status. 69 "[R]egulation of the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe 'is necessarily
inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status, and therefore tribal sov-
ereignty over such matters of external relations' is divested." ' 70 The
tribe did not contend that Congress had expressly delegated to it the
power to zone lands owned by non-Indians. Because this power was
not regarded as part of the inherent sovereignty retained by tribes, the
Court found that no such authority existed.71
Not only did four justices in Brendale subscribe to the notion that
the tribes have somehow lost "external sovereignty" over non-Indians
on non-Indian fee land, but they also construed narrowly the Court's
exceptions to that rule in Montana. The Brendale opinion acknowl-
edged the two instances in which Montana had upheld tribal civil
authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands. The first, involv-
ing a consensual relationship, did not apply. The second, involving
activity which threatened important interests of the tribe, arguably
applied. Because Montana had prefaced that exception with the word
"may," the four justices found that it did not necessarily apply in all
circumstances. Holding that a literal application of the exception to
the case would permit tribal regulation only as long as conduct threat-
ened tribal interests, and would therefore result in constant switching
of zoning authority between the tribe and the county, the justices
declined to apply the exception in this case. 72
Moreover, these justices also stated the Montana test more strin-
gently than Montana had stated it. They found that an activity to
which a protectable interest attaches "must be demonstrably serious
and must imperil the political integrity, economic security or the health
and welfare of the tribe. '73 Although the reasoning of these four
justices does not represent a majority view of the Court, combined
with the views of Justices Stevens and O'Connor - who argued that
the power to exclude did not give the tribe authority to regulate in a
heavily non-Indian area74 - their views form a majority. Thus, this
reasoning heavily influenced the decision, and certainly bears serious
attention.
69. Id. at 408.
70. Id. at 427 (opinion of White, J.) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 326 (1978)).
71. Id. at 425-26.
72. Id. at 429-30.
73. Id. at 431.
74. Id. at 434-45 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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2. Limitations on Use of Tribal Sovereignty
as a Backdrop in Preemption Analysis
Another peculiar twist imposed by the current Court is the notion
that tribal sovereignty can be used as a backdrop for preemption
analysis only if the tribe has actually exercised sovereign authority in
the specific area at issue in the case. That theory plays a part in two
recent decisions, Rice v. Rehne 5 and Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico.7 6
In Rice, the Court considered whether federal law preempted states
from requiring federally licensed Indian traders operating businesses
on Indian reservations to purchase state liquor licenses. Writing for
the Court, Justice O'Connor first looked for the "backdrop" of tribal
sovereignty which would inform the preemption analysis. O'Connor
found that if any interest in tribal sovereignty was implicated by
imposition of California's alcoholic beverage regulation, it existed only
insofar as the state attempted to regulate sales to tribal members. 77
The Court erroneously characterized earlier decisions as concluding
that no impact on tribal sovereignty exists where sales involve non-
Indians.78
Second, the Court seemed to operate on the premise that tribal
sovereignty was relevant as a "backdrop" to preemption analysis only
if the tribe had actually exercised tribal self-governance in the area of
liquor regulation. Because the tribe had not exercised inherent tribal
authority in the area of liquor regulation, and because liquor regulation
represented an area in which Congress had actually delegated authority
to the tribes, the Court felt that any inherent authority that may have
existed had actually been divested by Congress. Thus, the Court de-
clined to consider tribal sovereignty as a "backdrop. '79
Citing to Rice, the recent Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico o
75. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
76. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
77. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720.
78. Justice O'Connor cited Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463 (1976) and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980), for this proposition. Those cases, however, involved taxation of
non-Indian purchasers, rather than Indian traders, and do not stand for the proposition
that tribes have no sovereign interest in regulation of on-reservation sales to non-tribal
members. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 n.7.
79. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, pointed
out that the Court's tying of preemption to the fact that Indian tribes historically have
not regulated liquor is incorrect. They felt that the Court should have looked at federal
laws with the backdrop of sovereignty, regardless of whether the particular area is
traditionally within tribal control. Moe, they noted, held that a federally licensed Indian
trader operating on the reservation could not be required to get a state cigarette retailers
license. Rice, 463 U.S. at 738-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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decision based its holding on the notion that the "history of tribal
independence in the field at issue" is one of the components of
preemption analysis. At issue in Cotton Petroleum was whether the
1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act8' preempted New Mexico's taxation
of oil and gas leasing on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. Based on
an analysis of the 1938 Act and its precursor, the Court found that
- at least as to Executive Order reservations - state taxation of
nonmember oil and gas lessees was the norm from the beginning.
Thus, the Court held that no history of tribal independence from state
taxation existed to form a "backdrop" against which the relevant
federal legislation was to be read.82
3. Application of Non-Indian Preemption Analysis Where
No Backdrop of Tribal Sovereignty Is Found
In addition to the inclination to look at tribal sovereignty with
tumel vision, the current Court has also redefined the relationship
between the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty and the preemption
analysis. Earlier decisions used the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty
as a touchstone for broad construction of vague or ambiguous federal
enactments and policies in favor of Indian interests.8 3 Rice and Cotton
Petroleum, on the other hand, viewed the existence of specific tribal
sovereign authority in the area at issue as determinative of whether
Indian preemption analysis would be applied at all. The Rice opinion
acknowledged that the existence of a "backdrop" of tribal sovereign
authority in the area usually leads to application of the traditional
Indian preemption analysis:
When we determine that tradition had recognized a sover-
eign immunity in favor of the Indians in some respect, then
we usually are reluctant to infer that Congress has author-
ized the assertion of state authority in that respect "except
where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall
apply." Repeal by implication of an established tradition
of immunity or self-governance is disfavored.84
Because the Court failed to find traditional exercise of sovereign
authority in the area of liquor regulation, however, it applied standard
constitutional preemption analysis, with a presumption in favor of
state authority rather than against it. Based on the lack of a tradition
of self-government in the area of liquor regulation, the Court found
81. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
82. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 182.
83. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44
(1980); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
84. Rice, 463 U.S. at 719-20 (citations omitted).
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it "not necessary that Congress indicate expressly that the State has
jurisdiction to regulate the licensing and distribution of alcohol."8 5
Although the Court in Cotton Petroleum spoke of "flexible" Indian
preemption which resolves ambiguities in federal law in favor of tribal
independence, it nevertheless applied standard constitutional preemp-
tion analysis. As pointed out by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall in dissent, the majority ignored the broad policies and pur-
poses underlying the mineral leasing acts8 6 and the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act,87 and instead gave the statute a narrow, technical
construction not in keeping with Indian preemption analysis. 8 Thus,
the Court appears to have followed Rice's notion that lack of specific
tribal sovereignty leads to use of standard non-Indian preemption
analysis rather than the more flexible Indian preemption.
4. Tribal Authority Dependent on Demography
Brendale also adds another twist to Indian jurisdictional analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy
asserted that the tribe could not regulate non-Indian activities on fee
land within the reservation. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
upheld tribal zoning authority over all such lands on the reservation.
The outcome thus rested on the two swing justices, Justice Stevens
and Justice O'Connor, who ruled that the tribe had jurisdiction in the
closed area (mostly forest land held in trust) but no jurisdiction in the
open area (mostly agricultural and commercial land almost fifty percent
owned in fee). Those justices held that because alienation of about
half of the property in the open area had produced an integrated
community "not economically or culturally delimited by reservation
boundaries," 8 9 the tribe had lost its power to exclude nonmembers
from fee land in that area, and therefore its sovereign authority to
define the essential character of the territory.9
The case adds to the tests advanced by Montana the notion that
jurisdiction may depend on demography. Whether demography oper-
85. Id. at 731.
86. Act of May 29, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-158, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 398 (Supp. 1 1983)); Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396f (Supp. 1 1983)).
87. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-497 (1988)).
88. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 204 (1989). It is also
possible that the Court saw Cotton Petroleum more as an intergovernmental tax im-
munity case than as an Indian case because no tribal entity was a party to the suit
before the Court. However, the tribe had presented the preemption arguments clearly
in its amicus curiae brief before the Court. See id. at 170.
89. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 444 (1989).
90. Id.
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ates as a factor to be considered in determining that state jurisdiction
threatens tribal interests, or as a separate test capable of defeating
jurisdiction by itself, is unclear. Nonetheless, the use of such factors
in jurisdictional analysis significantly reduces the predictability of that
analysis and the guidance lower courts and relevant officials can draw
from the case law.
5. Deference to State Interests and Restriction of Tribal
and Federal Interests in Balancing in Tax Cases9'
Before Cotton Petroleum the Court balanced governmental interests
in determining whether state jurisdiction existed. Particularly in the
tax area, the balancing test analyzed: (1) the backdrop of tribal sov-
ereignty (in some cases viewed narrowly); (2) the applicable federal
law and policy which were to be construed liberally in favor of the
tribes; (3) whether a tribal injury existed in conflict with a federal
regulatory scheme; and (4) any state interest that might justify the
state tax, notwithstanding its conflict with the federal scheme.92 Cotton
Petroleum, however, altered the elements of this balancing test.
As noted above, the Court looked at the backdrop of tribal sover-
eignly narrowly and, finding no traditional exercise of sovereign au-
thority by the tribe, applied narrow non-Indian preemption analysis.
The Court also modified the interest analysis. In concluding that
Cotton Petroleum was distinguishable from earlier cases, the Court
evidenced an unwillingness to construe liberally the existence of tribal
injury in analyzing conflicts with governing federal policy. In fact, the
Court implied that to have an effect, tribal injury must be "substan-
tial." Likewise, it implied that in order for the pervasive federal
regulatory aspect of the federal preemption test to apply, federal
regulation must be not only pervasive, but also exclusive vis-a-vis any
state regulation. 93 Finally, the decision seems to indicate that virtually
any state service provided to Indians would be enough to justify state
taxes. If that were the case, minimal state interests might be sufficient
to support state regulatory jurisdiction. 94
Cotton Petroleum is arguably unique in that no showing of tribal
injury was made and the state interests were not well documented.
The twists it puts on the interest analysis may also be limited to tax
cases. In fact, the Brendale case, which was decided after Cotton,
found that state and tribal interests were to be weighed carefully and
did not imply that minimal state interests would be sufficient to justify
91. Because balancing of interests has played a unique role in tax cases, it is unclear
whether these changes in the balancing test would apply outside the tax area.
92. Williams & Gover, supra note 67, at 182.
93. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185-86 (1989).
94. Williams & Gover, supra note 67, at 184.
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state regulatory jurisdiction, at least in areas predominantly populated
by Indians. Nevertheless, the Cotton decision does indicate the Court's
tendency to retrench somewhat in its application of preemption analysis
to taxation of non-Indian activity on Indian reservations.
E. The Common Thread
Reviewing the historical development of jurisdictional principles in
Indian law, it is important to refer back to the strong outlines of
tribal jurisdiction as conceived and implemented by Marshall. Mar-
shall's model of inherent tribal sovereignty under federal authority,
with independence from the states, remains the basis of federal Indian
law. The recognition of tribal sovereign authority over Indians and
non-Indians alike is a given in jurisdictional analysis. It is this authority
which gives Indian tribes the ability to undertake and control natural
resources development on reservation lands.
The common thread in recent jurisdictional analysis, however, is
also important. The Court appears concerned about assertion of tribal
authority over non-Indians, and in some cases nonmembers, absent a
strong showing that the exercise of state authority, would threaten
basic tribal interests. This concern translates into a tendency to avoid
application of traditional, favorable Indian preemption analysis in
some cases. Likewise, the Court apparently routinely scrutinizes whether
tribal authority over non-Indians has been divested by virtue of tribal
dependent status. These tendencies are particularly aggravated where
tribal authority is asserted over non-Indians in areas heavily non-
Indian in demography. While some of the recent decisions involve
unique factors or may be limited in application, the unwillingness to
construe broadly tribal jurisdictional authority over non-Indians will
necessarily have implications for natural resources development on
Indian reservations. At the very least, creative lawyers and tribal
officials structuring deals for natural resources development in Indian
Country may wish to consider contractual arrangements with non-
Indian lessees concerning jurisdiction, cooperative arrangements with
state and federal authorities, and other arrangements to ensure that
jurisdiction is clearly delineated.
III. Outlines of Tribal, Federal, and State Jurisdiction in Specific
Areas Related to Natural Resources Development
The remainder of this article outlines briefly the current status of
tribal, federal, and state jurisdiction in areas relevant to natural re-
sources development.
A. Land Status as a Benchmark for Jurisdiction
Civil jurisdiction depends heavily on whether the activity at issue
occurred within or outside "Indian Country." The scope of "Indian
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
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Country" has been defined legislatively for purposes of criminal law."
This definition is also generally used in the civil context, subject to
resistance by a few lower courts.9
Indian Country encompasses all land within reservation boundaries,
however owned or held. Thus, it includes trust land held individually
and by the tribe, allotments, fee land, whether owned by Indians or
non-Indians, and any other land within the reservation boundaries. In
addition, some lands outside reservation boundaries are also included
within the definition of Indian Country. These are (1) dependent Indian
communities, including Pueblo lands, and (2) Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through such allotments.Y
It is often said that tribal power does not extend beyond reservation
boundaries 8 With the exception of tribal "long arm" statutes and
cooperative arrangements with local authorities, that adage is generally
true. Thus, the jurisdictional rules set forth in this article apply basi-
cally to activities taking place within reservation boundaries. Because
jurisdiction rests heavily on the distinction between what is on-reser-
vation and off-reservation, reservation boundaries often become criti-
cal. The myriad cases which have litigated reservation boundary issues
rest, no doubt, on underlying jurisdictional concerns.9 As noted above,
the way lands are held within reservation boundaries is also a factor
in determining whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-Indian activ-
ities on those lands.' ®
B. Jurisdiction to Tax
1. Tribal Taxation
No one disputes that tribes may tax their own members for activities
on the reservation.' 10 However, since non-Indian individuals and bus-
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
96. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) ("While
section 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has
recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction."). Some
courts., however, have been reluctant to follow this tenet in some cases. See G.M.A.C.
v. Chischilly, 628 P.2d 683, 685 (N.M. 1981) (holding that Navajo law was not applicable
to auto repossession on trust land outside reservation boundaries).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
93. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975);
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
Recent cases which present similar issues are Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. State, 742 F.
Supp. 1487 (D.N.M. 1990), and Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909
F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
101. COHEN, supra note 12, at 432; Williams & Gover, supra note 67, at 166.
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inesses may be heavily involved in natural resource development in
Indian Country, tribal authority to tax those individuals and entities
is also critical.
As noted above, tribal taxation of non-Indian activity is an area of
current controversy. Nonetheless, some rules of thumb do exist. Tribal
power to tax both Indians and non-Indians derives from the tribe's
general authority, as a sovereign, to control economic activity within
its jurisdiction and to defray the cost of providing governmental
services.102 The tribal power to tax hence derives from tribal powers
as sovereign governmental units rather than tribal ownership of land.
The extent of tribal taxation power over non-Indians, however, has
been held to depend on the nature of the lands on which the activity
to be taxed occurs.
a) Activities on Indian Lands
Non-Indians engaging in activities on Indian lands have been held
subject to tribal taxation. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation,103 the Supreme Court upheld tribal taxa-
tion of non-Indians engaging in commercial transactions with tribes
on Indian lands - in that case, purchasing cigarettes from tribal
smokeshops. Tribal jurisdiction exists even though the tax may have
been imposed after rather than at the time, the non-Indian began doing
business on the reservation.1°4
b) Activities on Non-Indian Fee Lands
Because the Supreme Court has not yet decided a case concerning
tribal authority to tax non-Indians on non-Indian fee land within the
reservation, tribal power to tax such activity is based on analogy from
other aspects of civil regulatory authority. The basic outlines of tribal
civil regulatory jurisdiction are described above. Suffice it to say that
under the rationale of Montana, tribes may tax non-Indians for activ-
ities on non-Indian fee land if the non-Indian involved has entered a
consensual relationship with the tribe or if his or her conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare of the tribe.105 With the recent Supreme Court
"twists" described above, this remains the basic rule applicable to
102. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). This is true
whether or not the tribe falls under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act. Kerr
McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
103. 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1991) (No.
91-545).
104. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145.
105. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
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exercise of taxing jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian land in
Indian Country.
2. State Taxation
States have taxing jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal lands only
to the extent that the exercise of such jurisdiction is not preempted
by federal legislation or comprehensive federal regulation or policy."' 6
As noted above, in the early cases the Court read federal statues and
policies expansively and presumed that injury would result to the tribe
or other persons protected by federal statutes. In Crow Tribe of Indians
v. Montana,'07 the Crow Tribe challenged application of Montana's
severance tax to production by non-Indian lessees of tribal coal inter-
ests. The Ninth Circuit struck down the state tax as conflicting with
the statutory goals of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act and im-
permissibly infringing on the tribe's right of self-government. 08 That
decision was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.'09 Shortly
thereafter, however, the Supreme Court upheld Montana's severance
tax as to coal leases on federal lands, finding that different acts and
policies were at issue." 0
The more recent Cotton Petroleum decision upheld New Mexico's
imposition of a severance tax on the on-reservation production of oil
and gas by non-Indian lessees, even though production was also subject
to an Indian tribe's severance tax."' The "twist" added to preemption
analysis by this and other more recent cases indicates that such analysis
may not be applied as expansively in favor of tribal jurisdiction as it
has in the past."2 However, the infringement analysis also maintains
some vitality in the taxation area."' Under the Crow Tribe case, state
taxation jurisdiction does not exist where it would interfere with tribal
self-government, at least where it would also threaten Congress' over-
riding general objective of encouraging tribal self-government and
economic development." 4
105. States may not, however, tax tribal royalty income generated by leases issued
pursuamt to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
107. 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
103. Id. at 900, 903.
109. 484 U.S. 997 (1988) (mem.).
110. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
111. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989).
112. See supra notes 80-82, 86-88 and accompanying text.
1111. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987).
114. The Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, may also pose a
barrier to state taxation on Indian lands. Although this issue had been raised in several
cases, the Supreme Court has not held, to date, that the Indian Commerce Clause
represents a per se barrier to state taxation. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). It has recently been held that state taxation of fee-patented
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C. Regulatory Jurisdiction - Zoning
Indian tribes have jurisdiction to zone trust and allotted lands within
their reservations."' The recent Brendale decision also confirms exclu-
sive tribal authority to regulate land use on non-Indian owned fee
lands in reservation areas which are heavily Indian-owned and popu-
lated. States and counties have no authority to regulate land use of
tribal or allotted lands, 1 6 and no authority to regulate zoning of non-
Indian lands within reservation areas which are demographically In-
dian." 7
In areas that are at least fifty percent demographically non-Indian,
however, Brendale upholds state and county zoning authority over
non-Indian lands." 8 Brendale also recognizes the inherent conflict and
unworkability of concurrent tribal and state zoning." 9 To the extent
that such concurrent authority is the outcome of Brendale, the inherent
conflicts and inconsistencies will be troublesome and may well need
attention through legislation or cooperative agreements.
D. Jurisdiction over Mineral and Timber Production
Pursuant to federal law, the federal government has promulgated
comprehensive regulatory schemes governing mineral and timber pro-
duction in Indian Country. The effects of this regulatory scheme are
twofold. First, a good part of the leasing activity on Indian lands is
federally controlled. 20 Although tribes may, as sovereigns, 'seek to
regulate lessees both by contract and through the exercise of their
Indian lands is authorized under § 6 of the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1988), and does not depend on a case-by-case analysis of the economic, political and
social effects of such tax on tribes. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 60 U.S.L.W. 4067 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992).
115. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 461 (1989); cf. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (regulation
of hunting and fishing).
116. See Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. County of Humboldt, 615 F.2d 1260
(9th Cir. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 462 (1989) ("[In] all of this Court's inherent sovereignty decisions,
including Montana, tribes retain the power to zone non-Indian fee lands on the reser-
vation.").
118. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 444; see also Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. Santa Fe,
503 P.2d 323 (N.M. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) (city planning authority
over Indian lands leased by the Pueblo for 99 years for building of subdivision held
not to interfere with tribal self-government).
119. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 466.
120. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982).
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police power, the overlapping federal and tribal schemes have led to
considerable litigation concerning tribal authority over lessees,' 2' the
federal trust responsibility for tribes in the area of mineral and timber
development,'2 and the relationship of federal and tribal authority.
The second result of comprehensive federal regulation is that state
authority over mineral development is generally preempted. Using
Indian preemption analysis, the Supreme Court in White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker,'2 struck down a state tax on a non-Indian
contractor of the Fort Apache Timber Company, the tribal enterprise
that managed, harvested, processed, and sold timber from the reser-
vation. The holding was based on comprehensive federal regulation of
timber harvesting and use of roads on reservation lands; the underlying
federal policy of assuring that the profits derived from timber sales
will inure to the benefit of the tribe; the Secretary of the Interior's
authority to set fees and rates with respect to the harvesting and sale
of tribal timber; and the fact that imposition of state taxes would
adversely affect the tribe's ability to comply with the sustained-yield
management policies imposed by federal law. Balancing state, tribal,
and federal interests, the Court found no state regulatory interests, as
opposed to a significant economic burden on the tribe, which threat-
ened to undercut the comprehensive federal regulatory program and
policies. 124
Although Bracker involves taxation, the comprehensive federal reg-
ulatory scheme and underlying policies similarly preempt the exercise
of other types of regulatory authority over timber and mineral pro-
duction. Many states have resource conservation laws that authorize
state agencies to issue orders creating drilling units, pooling orders,
utilization agreements, and other similar orders for all oil and gas
extraction in the state. Because of the pervasive federal regulatory
scheme governing timber and mineral production, however, the appli-
cability of these types of regulations in Indian Country depends on
action by the Secretary of Interior.'2
E. Hunting and Fishing
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe 26 established the basic rules
governing state and tribal jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on
121. See, e.g., Men-ion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Tenneco Oil
Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 725 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1984).
122. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206 (1983); Jicarilla Apache Tribe
v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982); Youngbull v. United States, No. 31-88L
(CI. Ct., Jan. 4, 1990); see also Winifred T. Gross, Note, Tribal Resources: Federal
Trust Responsibility: United States Energy Development Versus Trust Responsibilities
to Indian Tribes, 9 Am. INDLAN L. Ray. 309 (1981)'
123. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
124. Id. at 148.
125. See generally Richard K. Books, Note, Oil and Gas: The Effect of Oklahoma
Conservation Laws on Federal and Indian Lands, 29 OKua. L. REv. 994 (1976).
19F 46? IR 1 (1QIRl_
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Indian lands in Indian Country. In that case, the state conceded the
tribe's exclusive authority to regulate hunting and fishing by tribal
members and conceded that the tribe could also exercise authority over
nonmembers. However, the state contended that it could exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over nonmembers. The Court noted the historic
importance of hunting and fishing to the tribe, the geographic nature
of tribal sovereignty, and the strong federal policy favoring tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development. The Court found that concur-
rent state and tribal jurisdiction "would effectively nullify the Tribe's
authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation" and would
"disturb and disarrange ... the comprehensive scheme of federal and
tribal management [of hunting and fishing] established pursuant to
federal law."'' 2 Therefore, the Court asserted that the exercise of state
authority over hunting and fishing of nonmembers on tribal lands was
preempted. 1 2
As noted above, Montana v. United States found that tribal au-
thority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian
owned fee land on the reservation was limited to circumstances in-
volving consensual relationships between the tribe and the non-Indian
involved, or situations in which exercise of state jurisdiction would
threaten or have some direct effect on the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of the tribe. In Montana, the Court
found no such circumstances; the complaint did not allege that non-
Indian hunting and fishing on fee land imperiled the subsistence or
welfare of the tribe. In fact, the district court had made express
findings that the Crow Tribe had traditionally accommodated itself to
the State's "near exclusive" regulation of hunting and fishing on fee
lands within the reservation.1 Although the unique factual circum-
stances led the Court in Montana to uphold state jurisdiction, lower
courts deciding cases in related areas have generally upheld tribal
jurisdiction under the Montana test. 30
F. Environmental Regulation
Federal, state, and tribal governments all assert some regulatory
authority over environmental matters on Indian lands. The primary
127. Id. at 338.
128. Id. at 325.
129. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 n.13 (1981).
130. Williams & Gover, supra note 67, at 171. see, e.g., Knight v. Shoshone &
Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982) (zoning); Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (adminis-
tration of water). Some more recent decisions, however, have been influened by Brendale.
See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian
Law. Training Program) 3009 (D. Mont. 1990).
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issues in the area of environmental regulation have concerned state
attempts to implement state environmental programs in Indian Coun-
try, and whether tribes are on the same footing as states under federal
statutes regulating the environment.
Absent express legislative action, state attempts to implement state
environmental programs in Indian Country have been challenged.
Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA131 involved Washington's
attempt to impose its hazardous waste management program, devel-
oped pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), over Indians living on reservations within state boundaries.
The RCRA allows states to develop and implement hazardous waste
programs "in lieu" of the general federal program, and the scheme
submitted by Washington extended the state's regulations to Indians
on Indian lands. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
rejected application of Washington's program, Washington sued. Def-
erring to the EPA's interpretation, the Ninth Circuit struck down the
state regulation. Its holding, however, was specifically limited to the
exercise of state authority over Indians on Indian land. The court
stated that it was not addressing state regulation of non-Indians within
reservations. 112
Despite the existence of sovereign tribal authority in the area of
environmental regulation, that authority was often ignored in early
federal legislation and environmental policy. Recently, it has increas-
ingly been recognized by federal authorities. 3  On November 8, 1984,
the EPA issued a policy statement seeking to make the EPA Indian
policy consistent with the overall federal position in support of tribal
self-government. 34 For the first time, the EPA officially recognized
tribal governments as the primary parties responsible for establishing
standards and managing programs on reservation lands. The agency
promised to take affirmative steps to encourage and assist tribes in
assuming regulatory and program management responsibilities for res-
ervation lands. 3
131. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 1468.
133. See Judith V. Royster & Rory S.A. Fausett, Control of the Reservation Envi-
ronment. Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64
WASH. L. Rav. 581 (1989); Karen Breslin, Addressing Environmental Problems on
Indian Lands: Tribal Sovereignty Versus State and EPA Regulatory Authority, 19 Env't
Rep. 03NA) 1920 (1989).
134. EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian
Reservations I (Nov. 8, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Policy]; see NAT'L CONOIRSS OF AM.
INDIANS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN INDIAN CouNTRY: A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBAL
LEADERS AND REsOuRCE MANAGERS, IV 1-29 (National Congress of American Indians
1988) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION].
135. EPA Policy, supra note 134, at 2; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note
134, at IV 4. This policy has recently been reaffirmed. Memorandum from William K.
Reilly, Administrator, EPA, to Assistant Administrators, General Counsel et al. (July
10, 1991) (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
[Vol. 17
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/4
No. 1] DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 95
The EPA's efforts to delegate authority to the tribes in the environ-
mental area have been upheld. 36 The translation of federal policy into
statutory and regulatory action, however, has sometimes been incon-
sistent and unclear. In some cases Congress has passed amendments
clearly placing tribes on an equal footing with states. For example,
the 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and
the Clean Water Act place tribes on an equal footing with the states
in establishing standards and managing programs on reservation lands. 37
Even in the face of ostensibly clear congressional action, however,
uncertainties still exist. For example, to be classified as a state under
the SDWA, tribes must meet enumerated criteria. Three of these -
recognition by the Department of Interior, existence of an active
governing body, and capability of administering an effective water
program - are relatively straightforward. The fourth, however, re-
quires a tribe to demonstrate that its tribal government has the nec-
essary "subject matter and geographical jurisdiction."' 35 The EPA
regulations issued under the SDWA recognize that tribal jurisdiction
over some areas on reservations may be in dispute. With regard to
those areas, the EPA requires tribes to submit statements explaining
the legal basis for their jurisdiction, permits comment by neighboring
tribal and state governments, and then provides for the EPA, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Interior, to decide questions of
jurisdiction where competing claims exist.13 9 While this policy may
make good sense when reservation boundaries are in question, it raises
questions as applied to jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land on reser-
vations. In those cases, it effectively places the EPA and Department
of Interior in the position of applying the Montana test to determine
jurisdiction.Y°
The issue of whether and how the EPA should require tribes to
demonstrate jurisdiction on their reservations has sparked substantial
debate. Based on the theory that reservations should be regulated as
legal and administrative units, the EPA has recently announced that
as a general matter it will delegate environmental programs only to
governments (state or tribal) which have adequate jurisdiction over all
136. See, e.g., Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081
(1981) (delegation of Clean Air Act authority to tribes upheld).
137. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-ll (1988); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b) (1988); see 53 Fed. Reg. 37,398 (1988).
139. 40 C.F.R. § 145.52-.58 (1990).
140. Montana's provision for tribal jurisdiction based on contractual relationships
and on actions affecting significant tribal interests would seem to apply, particularly in
view of the fact that water in aquifers is transient and can easily migrate from non-
Indian sources in "checkerboard" areas of reservations into the main water sources of
the tribe.
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reservation pollution sources, including both those on trust and fee
lands . 4' As a general matter, 42 the EPA believes that tribes will meet
this standard. The agency has announced its intention to view activities
regulated under environmental statutes as presumptively having serious
and substantial impacts on human health and welfare, thus falling
within tribal jurisdiction under the Montana test, whether on fee or
trust lands within reservations. 4 3
In some cases, Congress itself has been less definitive. For example,
the RCRA defines "municipalities" to include Indian tribes, but au-
thorizes only states or regional authorities to assume responsibility.'4
Likewise, tribes have traditionally had authority to act as states under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) 145 only with regard to the establishment of
pristine air areas,"" although the CAA now treats tribes as states for
purposes of implementing national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards.4 7 Thus, the jurisdictional arrangements and degree
of uncertainty vary according to the type of environmental regulation
as well as from case to case."'8
G. Water Rights
Water rights as well as jurisdiction to administer those rights and
to regulate water use are also critical to tribal natural resources de-
velopment. A full discussion of Indian water law is far beyond this
article's scope. It should be noted that Indian tribes generally possess
reserved rights to water with priority dates often dating from the
141. Memorandum from William K. Reilly, supra note 135, at 3-4.
142. Although this legal analysis is published in the context of the Clean Water Act,
its language indicates the EPA's intention to apply the analytical thrust described in the
announcement more broadly to environmental statutes permitting tribal regulation on
reservations. 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878-79.
143. Indian Reservation Water Quality Standards Regulation, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,878
(EPA 1991) (section titled Legal Analysis of the EPA). As set forth in the analysis,
once a tribe has made a relatively simple factual showing and asserted that activities of
non-Indians on fee lands have serious and substantial effects on the health and welfare
of the tribe, the EPA will presume an adequate showing of tribal jurisdiction on fee
lands unless an appropriate governmental entity demonstrates lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at 64,879. The EPA also views the Clean Water Act itself as constituting a legislative
determination that activities which affect surface water and critical habitat quality may
have serious and substantial impacts, as expressing a congressional preference for tribal
regulation of surface water quality. Id. at 64,878. The EPA has chosen to use a "serious
and substantial" standard based on the subsequent judicial interpretations of the Mon.
tand test. Id.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13)(A) (1988).
145. Id. §§ 7400-7642.
146. Id. § 7474(a)(2)(C)(c), (e).
147. Id. § 7601(d).
148. For an excellent description of the various programs and jurisdictional arrange-
ments, see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 134.
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creation of their reservations and in amounts necessary to fulfill the
purposes of those reservations. In Wyoming v. United States (the Big
Horn Case),'49 the Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal
reserved rights and use of the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard
to measure rights. 150 It is also well established that subsequent uses of
water are not limited to the purposes for which the reservation was
created.'
One of the issues left open by the Big Horn Case is administration
of water rights. As tribes increasingly enact ordinances and codes
extending tribal authority over all water resources and water users on
their reservations - often in conflict with state assertions of jurisdic-
tion over the same elements - this issue becomes critical.
Tribes have exclusive authority to regulate water use on reservations
where such use has no impact off the reservation. 15 2 State authority in
this instance is preempted by the tribe's right to self-government.
However, based on the Montana holding, states have been held to
possess the authority to regulate the use of excess Indian water by
non-Indians on fee land where the water flowed past the edge of the
reservation.'53 How questions of administration would be resolved in
cases which have facts less polar than those involved in the above
situations is unclear. The district court for the Eastern District of
Washington held that the Yakima Tribal Water Code was invalid
insofar as it purported to regulate non-Indian uses of excess water on
fee lands within the reservation.'54 In that case, no evidence was
presented from which the court could conclude that regulation was
appropriate under the Montana test, either based on a consensual
relationship or on a showing that non-Indian water use affected the
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
tribe. 5 More recently, however, the Shoshone Tribe was found to
have authority to regulate water by all users on its reservation under
the earlier Big Horn decree.'56
149. 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S.
406 (1989) (In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System).
150. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 76. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that
groundwater was not included in Indian reserved water rights, but that issue was not
presented for Supreme Court decision.
151. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
152. Colville, 647 F.2d at 42.
153. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
154. Holly v. Confederated Tribes, 655 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Wash. 1985), aff'd sub
nom. Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987).
155. Holly, 655 F. Supp. at 559.
156. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 5073 (1991).
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Thus, numerous questions which will affect tribal development of
water resources are yet to be resolved. In addition to administration,
these include questions of water marketing, an issue tied perhaps even
more directly to tribal natural resources development policy.
IV. Conclusion
The complexity surrounding jurisdiction over activities in Indian
Country is overwhelming. Many issues remain to be resolved, and
recent Supreme Court cases indicate that now may not be the time
for tribes to test the limits of their jurisdiction before the Supreme
Court, at least as that jurisdiction relates to non-Indians and non-
Indian activities.
Hence, the current situation argues for a need for cooperation,
wherever possible, among tribal, state, and federal officials. In making
deals concerning natural resources development on Indian reservations,
cooperation can be enhanced by structuring the deals so that surround-
ing jurisdictions, as well as tribes, have an interest in making them
work. Contractual arrangements with non-Indian lessees and cooper-
ative arrangements with state and federal authorities are a necessary
part of successful deal-making. In drafting cooperative agreements, it
would also seem advisable for attorneys to attempt to resolve juris-
dictional and enforcement uncertainties, reserving applicable legal po-
sitions if necessary.
Regulation of non-Indian rights is to be administered according to state water law by
the tribal agency, with appropriate judicial review in state district court. This case is
currently on appeal in the Wyoming Supreme Court.
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